

δὲ κατὰ τε σώματος διαθήκην καὶ τῶν ἐπεισιόντων καὶ τῶν ἀντιστηριζόντων.'

554 Democritus fr. 11, Sextus *adv. math.* vii, 138 (after 550) ἐν δὲ τοῖς Κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις· τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνησίην καλεῖ προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίην ὀνομάζει ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀπλανές. λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν· 'γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· καὶ σκοτίης μὲν τάδε σύμπαντα, ὄψις, ἀκοή, ὄδμη, γεῦσις, ψαῦσις. ἡ δὲ γνησίη, ἀποκεκριμένη δὲ ταύτης.' εἶτα προκρίνων τῆς σκοτίης τὴν γνησίην ἐπιφέρει λέγων· 'ὅταν ἡ σκοτίη μηκέτι δύνηται μήτε ὀρῆν ἐπ' ἔλαττον μήτε ἀκούειν μήτε ὀδμαῖσθαι μήτε γεύεσθαι μήτε ἐν τῇ ψαύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ λεπτότερον...'

552 Wretched mind, do you take your assurances from us and then overthrow us [*sc.* the senses]? Our overthrow is your downfall.

553 In the *Confirmations*, although he had promised to assign the power of assurance to the senses, he is none the less found condemning them, for he says: 'But we in actuality grasp nothing for certain, but what shifts in accordance with the condition of the body and of the things which enter it and press upon it.'

554 But in the *Canons* he says there are two kinds of knowing, one through the senses and the other through the intellect. Of these he calls the one through the intellect 'legitimate', attesting its trustworthiness for the judgement of truth, and that through the senses he names 'bastard', denying it inerrancy in the discrimination of what is true. To quote his actual words: 'Of knowledge there are two forms, one legitimate, one bastard. To the bastard belong all this group: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The other is legitimate, and separate from that.' Then, preferring the legitimate to the bastard, he continues: 'When the bastard can no longer see any smaller, or hear, or smell, or taste, or perceive by touch, but finer...'¹ (*After Barnes*)

¹ Here the text breaks off in mid-sentence.

552 and 553 indicate that Democritus' scepticism was not so thoroughgoing that he denied the senses any positive role at all in epistemology. His title *Confirmations* suggests he would have envisaged the mind as replying thus to the senses' complaint that in 549-50 they are rejected entirely: 'Not so. You *tell* us very few truths about the