

POSIDONIUS


II. THE COMMENTARY:

(ii) Fragments 150-293

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Galen, *De Placitis* v.472-3,
3.11 M, p. 330.6-21 De Lacy

CONTENT

ation. Galen comments on part of a
Posidonius (cf. F150b).

CONTEXT

(F187.37ff.).

COMMENT

eds on the recognition of the cause of the

ional solution that derives from Posido-
the cause of πάθη through his psycho-
ational aspect(s) of the soul cannot be
d to reason: 'the irrational is helped and
rrational, the rational by knowledge and
his sums up F31.1-29, esp. 28f. Cf. Frs.

entrates on the training of the irrational.
ad (in *Rep.* and *Laws*), it includes music
n); to this is added 'practices' (ἐπιτηδεύ-
individual stamp of Posidonius. One has
ral characteristics of the subject, and
ining for the dull, sluggish, timid charac-
more fiery, crazily helter-skelter nature
; naturally from Posidonius' views on
, 84ff comm.). The purpose is to mould
abituation so that the emotional move-
ed (e.g. χρηστοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐθισθεί-
165.172ff) or so shaped as to bring them

into obedience and concord with the rational aspect, as F31.
The anecdote on Damon subduing a drunken party of young
men which had become crazily out of hand, by making the
girl who was playing the recorder change from the Phrygian
to the Dorian mode (9-13), shows that the training applied to
adults as well as children.

Although the comment comes from Galen, the language as
well as the content indicates that a Posidonian passage is not
far away. In the next exposition in this series, Galen simply
uses a quotation (F162). For θυμικωτέρους (7): F169.87;
ἐπιτηδεύμασι (3, 6), and ἀμβλείς (4): F169.116; μανικώτερον
(7, 11): F164.1; ἄττοντας (8): F169.10; ἐμπλήκτου (12):
F187.52; φορᾶς (13): φέρεσθαι F187.9, ἔκφορος F166.11, 16;
τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς (14) and κινήσεων ἀλόγων (15f)
are virtually Posidonian technical terms; and for the sudden
exasperated exclamation, ἐπεὶ διὰ τί πρὸς θεῶν (8), cf. F18.7,
F165.166.

The anecdote on Damon (DK, 37.A8), the 5th-century B.C.
sophist and friend of Pericles, could also have come from
Posidonius, because the inference from it is Posidonian (οὐ
γὰρ δήπου κτλ, 13ff). For similar comment on the different
effects on behaviour of the modes, in which Damon is also
featured, Pl. *Laches* may be compared.

F169 Galen, *De Placitis* v.459-65,
pp. 437.1-444.11 M,
pp. 316.21-322.26 De Lacy

CONTENT

The problem of evil. The explanation of how vice arises,
beginning from the behaviour of children; its constitution and
the effect of physique and environment. How it may be cured.

CONTEXT

F167, Context. An argument runs from 312.22–316.20 De Lacy, consisting of an attack on Chrysippus for being unable to explain, because of his mistaken psychology, how one can heal πάθη when they occur, or prevent them from occurring. Posidonius is associated with this argument: F167. F169 follows, and is followed immediately by F31.

STRUCTURE

A. (1–18)

The problem of the διοίκησις, or governing power, in children. Chrysippus cannot explain the facts of the behaviour of children (and animals), which does not follow from and is in fact contradictory to his theory.

B. (18–34)

Explanation of this behaviour by a theory of οικειώσεις, which comes from Posidonius, and is contrasted with Chrysippus' position.

C. (35–49)

Chrysippus accordingly cannot solve three difficulties, which are enumerated, in the problem of evil.

D. (49–77)

Chrysippus' two-fold explanation of the cause of corruption in children is criticised by Galen, who is following Posidonius.

E. (78–84)

Posidonius' explanation of the cause of vice, and how it is that children err.

F. (84–106)

Further amplification of the problems from Posidonius'

CONTEXT

The argument runs from 312.22–316.20. De-
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to explain the facts of his mistaken psychology,
how one can prevent them from occurring.
Associated with this argument: F167. F169
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F. (84–106)

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theory of physiognomy, which makes clearer another of the
aporiai with regard to κακία, the manner of its constitution.

G. (106–17)

How vice may be cured.

COMMENT

A. (1–18)

Galen, confining himself to what is most necessary for his
subject (1) begins with the problem of the governing power of
children, τὸ περὶ τῆς τῶν παιδῶν διοικήσεως (3). διοίκησις
is the noun corresponding to διοικεῖν, which is used again of
irrational creatures (ζῷα) in F33.3. Cf. also Frs. 21, 102 for
oral usage.

The observation of the behaviour of small children and
animals is for Galen an important starting point as evidence,
and recurs in the *De Sequela* (F35), and in his *De Moribus* (see
Walzer, 'New Light on Galen's Moral Philosophy', *Greek into
Arabic* 151ff). It was also so for Posidonius, whom Galen at
least partly follows, in particular because it formed part of the
base of Posidonius' attack on Chrysippus (apart from this fr.,
Frs. 31, 33, 35).

The argument begins with two denials aimed at Chry-
sippus:

(1) 'It is impossible to say that children's impulses have
reason (λόγος) as their guardian (ἐπιτροπεύεσθαι), for
children don't yet have reason (4f).' This is common Stoic
doctrine which worked on a hebdomadal system of maturity.
It was even one of the reasons why Chrysippus denied πάθη in
young children.

(2) 'Nor can one say that they are not angry, feel pain
and pleasure, laugh, weep and undergo countless other such
πάθη; for children feel more frequent and more severe
emotions than adults.' Chrysippus would not have denied
that children display these feelings (44ff), but would say that

they are not πάθη in his sense of the term, but that they are prepathetic.

8 But Galen maintains strongly (οὐ μὴν . . . γε) that these facts, that children feel emotions, do not follow (logically, ἀκολουθεῖ, cf. ἀκόλουθος in F47.74, F49.8, and below, line 46) from Chrysippus' doctrines, just as they don't follow either from his view that there is no natural affinity (οἰκειώσις) to pleasure or alienation (ἄλλοτριώσις) from pain. Posidonius did claim such οἰκειώσις, see below. But orthodox Stoic doctrine held that pleasure (ἡδονή) was a true ἀδιόφορον, not even προηγμένον; *SVF* I. 190, 195; III. 155, 136; explicitly in D.L. VII.85 (*SVF* III.178).

10ff Galen's reason (γάρ) is an appeal to fact: 'all children rush untaught towards pleasures, avert themselves and flee from pains'.

12-18 There follows a striking passage of embroidery: 'We see (ὁρῶμεν) them raging, kicking, biting, wanting to win and boss other children, like some animals (ζῷα, as F33), where no other prize is on offer but victory. Such conduct is obvious in quail, cocks, partridge, ichneumon, asp, crocodile and countless others.' It is tempting to trace Posidonius here; Galen used similar language elsewhere (Walzer, 'New Light'), but the common origin could have been a striking passage in Posidonius. The very appeal to the obviousness of fact, while of course Galenic, is also very much Posidonian (φαίνεται . . . ἐναργῶς as τὰ ἐναργῶς φαινόμενα, Frs. 159, 156; see F167, comm. *ad fin.*). It is a characteristic of Posidonius most admired by Galen, and possibly a reason why he called him 'most scientific', F35, comm. B.3, and T58.

B. (18-34)

The critical approach of A is followed by the positive statement of a theory of οἰκειώσεις.

18-21 A summing up of what has gone before (οὖν): 'so children too (i.e. like animals) seem to have a natural affinity (οἰκειοῦσθαι) to pleasure and victory (Posidonian: Frs. 158,

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160), just as at some later time they show when they grow up
that they have a natural οἰκειώσις towards moral values (τὸ
καλόν). Chrysippus only recognised the latter; the οὕτως . . .
ὥσπερ construction stresses the equal importance of the
earlier natural affinities.

21-6 'Part proof of this (γοῦν) is that they are ashamed as
they grow older of their mistakes, are glad in (χαίρει; χαρά is
the emotion in the σοφός counter to ἡδονή, D.L.
VII.116 = SVF III.431) noble actions, lay claim to justice and
the other virtues and often act in accordance with their
notions of these virtues, whereas before when they were still
small they lived by emotion (κατὰ πάθος), having no care for
the commands arising from reason (τῶν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου
προσταγμάτων); as exactly F31.13f. This is proof only that
the behaviour of small children differs from that of adults,
and that the development of a rational morality comes later,
none of which Chrysippus would have denied.

26-30 The theory is now stated: 'hence, since these three
things to which we have an affinity (οἰκειώσεων) exist
fundamentally by nature (φύσει stressed because denied by
Chrysippus) corresponding to each form (εἶδος) of the parts
(μορίων) of the soul, pleasure through τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν,
victory through τὸ θυμοειδές, morality (τὸ καλόν) through τὸ
λογιστικόν . . .'. This is Posidonius' theory (Frs. 158; 161;
165.146ff; 31), but Galen expresses it in his own words (εἶδος,
μόρια of the soul, which Posidonius denied, Frs. 142-6),
perhaps because he wishes to stress the Platonic base.

30-4 Since οἰκειώσις is linked to a psychology of three
distinct aspects of soul, Galen can now classify the mistakes of
his predecessors: (1) Epicurus fixed his gaze on the natural
affinity of the worst part of the soul only (i.e. to pleasure); (2)
Chrysippus concentrated solely on the best (τὸ λογιστικόν,
τὸ καλόν); (3) it was only the 'ancient' philosophers who
observed all three natural affinities. (Galen or Posidonius or
both project the term back to ἀρχαῖοι; cf. Brink, *Phronesis* 1
(1956), 123ff; *Harv. Stud.* 63 (1958), 193-8). But since, as

Galen well knew, this was also true of Posidonius, who was not for Galen an 'ancient' philosopher, this only makes sense if Galen forgot here that he was using Posidonius, *or* if this classification comes straight from Posidonius. The latter assumption is argued under *C* below. For the concept of a mistaken 'partial' view of human nature, cf. Galen, *De Sequ.* xi.814, *Scripta Min.* II.73 M; the same chapter from which F35 comes.

C. (35-49)

The base is now laid for the main theme of the fragment, that by ignoring two οἰκείωσεις, Chrysippus naturally cannot solve (ἀπορεῖ) the origin of vice. A classification is given of three questions which Chrysippus cannot answer: (1) the cause (αἰτίαν) of how vice comes to be; (2) the manner of its constitution (τρόπους τῆς συστάσεως); (3) how children err.

38f. Posidonius' name is brought in for the first time: 'for all of which Posidonius too reasonably censures and refutes Chrysippus'. What is definite is that Posidonius attacked on all three points; but it seems likely from the analysis of the earlier part of the fragment, that Galen had been following Posidonius from the beginning.

39-49 What follows appears to carry on Posidonius' argument (γάρ, 39). It is designed to lead up to Chrysippus' account of the origin of evil.

(1) On Chrysippus' theory it cannot come from within, because if it were really true (δῆ, 39) that children had a natural affinity to morality right from the beginning (εὐθύς ἐξ ἀρχῆς, 40), vice could only arise from an external source (39-42). This is garbled over-simplification, because Chrysippus did not hold that children had an οἰκείωσις πρὸς τὸ καλόν from the beginning. Children did have οἰκείωσεις, but not for pleasure (*SVF* III.178ff). Nevertheless, Chrysippus did have a problem once the οἰκείωσις πρὸς τὸ καλόν was operative.

(2) But then there is a *factual* paradox (ὀρᾶται γε, 42),

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C. (35-49)

is the main theme of the fragment, that children are born with a disposition to vice. A classification is given of the vices which Chrysippus cannot answer: (1) the nature of vice; (2) the manner of its origin; (3) how children

are brought in for the first time: 'for us too reasonably censures and refutes the view that definite is that Posidonius attacked on it seems likely from the analysis of the fragment, that Galen had been following from the beginning.

Chrysippus appears to carry on Posidonius' theory. It is designed to lead up to Chrysippus' explanation of evil.

Chrysippus' theory it cannot come from within, but is naturally true (δή, 39) that children had a disposition right from the beginning (εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς) and only arise from an external source (39-40). This is an over-simplification, because Chrysippus held that children had an οἰκείωσις πρὸς τὸ καλόν (41). Children did have οἰκείωσις, but not for evil (42). Nevertheless, Chrysippus did have a disposition πρὸς τὸ καλόν was operative. There is a *factual* paradox (ὁρᾶται γε, 42),

that we see children going wrong in any case (πάντως, 43), even if brought up in good habits.

Since Chrysippus admits this and does not dare to falsify τὰ ἐναργῶς φαινόμενα he must explain how vice can occur from an external source (44-9).

D. (49-77)

51-4 Chrysippus' explanation of the cause of corruption (τῆς διαστροφῆς τὴν αἰτίαν is two-fold (cf. D.L. vii.89): (a) from oral communication from the majority of men; (b) from the very nature of the things (τῶν πραγμάτων). It is clear from the following criticism that 'the things themselves' refer to pleasure (60), pain (62), praise, honour, censure, disgrace (63-5), all summed up by πιθανότης τῶν φαντασιῶν (70f), pleasure projecting the persuasive appearance of being good (72).

55-77 Galen (ἐγὼ δὲ, 54) criticises both explanations in turn; but Posidonius is behind this, see 77. Both positions are again similarly attacked by Galen in *De Sequela*, see F35, where once more Posidonius is cited (F35, comm. B).

(1) 55-7 Chrysippus' first explanation is quickly dealt with; the argument is based on οἰκείωσις. There is no natural affinity for evil (as of course all Stoics would agree), therefore why should children be attracted to it merely by observing or hearing an outside example of it? Cf. *De Sequ.*, *Scripta Min.* ii.74.21-77.1 M, after which Posidonius is named.

(2) 57-77 Galen is still more surprised by Chrysippus' second explanation (57f). For this attack cf. F35 comm. A (*De Sequ.*). 'For what necessity (ἀνάγκη) is there that children be enticed by pleasure as a bait (δελεαζέσθαι, 60) if they have no affinity to it, or turn themselves and flee from pain if they are not naturally alienated from it too' (59-63)? There is a linguistic link with *De Sequ.* 77.6 M, where δέλεαρ is used in the same context in the sentence before F35 q.v. The ultimate source is Pl. *Tim.* 69d, but Posidonius is the likely intermediary. The argument is *ad hominem*, again based on οἰκείωσις.

Chrysippus did not hold that children have an οἰκείωσις to pleasure, Posidonius did.

In fact the argument shifts to the positive aspect (63-6): 'why should children have to (τίς ἀνάγκη) fling themselves at (ἴεσθαι, 64) and delight in praise, honour etc., if it is true that (εἴπερ, 65) they actually (καί) do not have natural (φύσει) affinity and alienation towards these?' The implication now is that they definitely do have such an οἰκείωσις.

Indeed Galen suggests (66-9) that if Chrysippus does not actually say so, his words imply (τῇ γε δυνάμει, 67) that he recognised some kind of (τις) οἰκείωσις of this sort. Because when he says that corruption (or distortion, διαστροφή) arises through the persuasiveness of appearances (διά τε τῆν πιθανότητα τῶν φαντασιῶν, 70f), he must be asked the cause (or explanation, τὴν αἰτίαν, 72, surely Posidonian) why pleasure proffers a persuasive φαντασία of good, and pain of evil. (For a form of πιθανή φαντασία, see F162.) A somewhat abrupt and unexpected illustration (from Posidonius?) concludes the argument with a strong appeal to fact (73-7): 'and so why are we so readily persuaded when we hear winning at the Olympics and erection of one's statue praised and glorified by the majority as good, and defeat and disgrace as evils?' This seems to be rather an instance related to adults.

(3) 77 'Yes and these things too (καί ταῦθ') are criticised by Posidonius.' It is of course possible that ταῦτα refers only to the preceding sentence (73-7), but it is likely that Galen has been following Posidonius from the beginning of the argument: F35 comm. B (7-18). The source was Posidonius' Περὶ παθῶν, see F35.

E. (78-84)

78-80 'And Posidonius tries to show that the causes (τὰς αἰτίας) of all false suppositions (πασῶν τῶν ψευδῶν ὑπολήψεων) . . .' What follows is uncertain. The codices have ἐν μὲν τῷ θεωρητικῷ διὰ τῆς παθητικῆς ὀλκῆς. . . . This neither makes sense, nor satisfactory phrasing of the Greek, because

that children have an οἰκείωσις to shifts to the positive aspect (63-6): e to (τίς ἀνάγκη) fling themselves at a praise, honour etc., if it is true that (καί) do not have natural (φύσει) wards these? The implication now is ave such an οἰκείωσις.

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ἐν μὲν τῷ θεωρητικῷ demands an antithesis to which διὰ τῆς παθητικῆς ὀλκῆς belongs. Pohlenz first in 1898 (in his Diss., *De Posidonii libris Περὶ παθῶν* 560-5) posited a lacuna after θεωρητικῷ (cf. *Die Stoa* II.113); this has rightly won general acceptance, and different suggestions have been made to complete the text, although Reinhardt (*Posidonios* 315f; *RE* 740) seems eventually to have given it up. The first question to decide is the antithesis to τὸ θεωρητικόν. Pohlenz, with his eye on Plu. *De Virt., Mor.* 448A, suggested ἐν δὲ τῷ πρακτικῷ, and this was accepted by Edelstein and De Lacy, and indeed by me in volume I. It is true that Stoics seemingly differentiated between virtues which are θεωρηματικά and those which were ἀθεώρητοι (D.L. VII.90 = *SVF* III.197), and speak of the virtuous man as θεωρητικός and πρακτικός τῶν ποιητέων (D.L. VII.125 = *SVF* III.295). Stobaeus uses the term πρακτικὴ ὁρμή (*SVF* III.169, 171, 173); the πρακτικός βίος is one of the three stock lives (D.L. VII.130 = *SVF* III.687); and there is even an obscure passage in Ammonius (*SVF* II.49) which refers to the πρακτικὸν μόριον of the soul. But none of this is very relevant to Posidonius here. From what follows, 81-4, and especially the subsequent antithesis in 82-4, Posidonius by τὸ θεωρητικόν appears to have in mind τὸ λογιστικόν. If this is so, the natural antithesis in Posidonian Greek is τὸ παθητικόν (τῆς ψυχῆς) (thus Frs. 148, 31, 33, and index vol. I s.v. παθητικός; cf. Plu. *Mor.* 441c). On the other hand, I agree with Edelstein (and De Lacy) that the cause of false assumptions ἐν τῷ θεωρητικῷ can only be ἀμαθία for Posidonius (as F31.24ff; F168). Therefore I would now suggest: ἐν μὲν τῷ θεωρητικῷ <διὰ τῆς ἀμαθίας γινομένων, ἐν δὲ τῷ παθητικῷ> διὰ τῆς παθητικῆς ὀλκῆς. . . .

Since Galen says at this point that Posidonius was trying to explain all false ὑπολήψεις, it is natural that he should have included intellectual mistakes (ἐν τῷ θεωρητικῷ: F165.172-89, comm.); but the immediate context is the explanation of πάθος, especially beginning with children. Posidonius explains this principally by the 'emotional pull' in the

irrational δυνάμεις of the soul (ἐν τῷ παθητικῷ). The term 'emotional pull' appears to have been coined by Posidonius to convey the action of his 'emotional movements' (F153). Posidonius may have derived the idea of ὀλκή from Plato (as *Laws* 644e; *Rep.* 439b; *Phdr.* 254c).

80-4 What follows seems puzzling, and may have been compressed by Galen. It is clear from Posidonius' controversy with Chrysippus and Zeno over the relationship between πάθος and κρίσις (see Frs. 34, 151, 152), that Posidonius held that πάθη were not judgements or rational decisions, nor did they result from rational decisions, but that it was the irrational movements of the 'emotional pull' that affected and distorted rational judgement, whether in children or adults. Now (80-2) he says that the 'emotional pull' is preceded by 'false beliefs' (τὰς ψευδεῖς δόξας), when the rational faculty has become weak περὶ τὴν κρίσιν. This has been thought to be inconsistent, but I do not think this is so. I take the ψευδεῖς δόξαι to be the beliefs that pleasure and winning are good, and their opposites evil, which Galen outlined above. We have a natural affinity to these (οἰκειώσεις), but *simpliciter* they are ψευδεῖς δόξαι; yet this triggers a ὀρμή, which if the rational faculty is in a weak state becomes a πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή, which in turn through its 'emotional pull' demands an assent (συγκατάθεσις), and so affects a κρίσις or rational decision to a particular act. So the main αἰτία remains the 'emotional pull', although it is preceded by the ψευδεῖς δόξαι from our οἰκειώσεις and a weak λογιστικόν; see especially F164. This is further explained in 106-17. But the κρίσις is not the δόξαι, but comes at the end of the process as a result of the παθητικὴ ὀλκή. This is amplified further in *F* below, 84ff; see also F170. In general: Kerferd, 'The Origin of Evil in Stoic Thought', *Bull. of J. Rylands Univ. Libr. of Manchester* 60 (1978), 482-94.

82-4 Posidonius goes on to say, according to Galen, that a creature's (ζῷον, to include both children and animals as well as adults, since he held that they too had πάθη: F33)

soul (ἐν τῷ παθητικῷ). The term have been coined by Posidonius to 'emotional movements' (F153). used the idea of δόκη from Plato (as . 254c).

is puzzling, and may have been clear from Posidonius' controversy over the relationship between 4, 151, 152), that Posidonius held emotions or rational decisions, nor did rational decisions, but that it was the 'emotional pull' that affected movement, whether in children or says that the 'emotional pull' is (τὰς ψευδεῖς δόξας), when the weak περι τὴν κρίσιν. This has content, but I do not think this is so. I believe the beliefs that pleasure and pain are opposites evil, which Galen's natural affinity to these (οικείω-ψευδεῖς δόξαι; yet this triggers a faculty is in a weak state becomes a turn through its 'emotional pull' (ἀθεσις), and so affects a κρίσις or particular act. So the main αἰτία is 'pull', although it is preceded by the ὥσεις and a weak λογιστικόν; see her explained in 106-17. But the comes at the end of the process as a ἦ. This is amplified further in F 1 general: Kerferd, 'The Origin of *ull. of J. Rylands Univ. Libr. of* 14.

to say, according to Galen, that of both children and animals as well that they too had πάθη: F33)

ὁρμή is born sometimes in the rational decision of the rational faculty (ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ κρίσει), but very often in the movement of the emotional faculty (ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει τοῦ παθητικοῦ). This is not inconsistent either. Of course τὸ λογιστικόν has its own ὁρμή (towards τὸ καλόν, 29f) but πάθος has its ὁρμή in the irrational movements. As often in a μὲν . . . δέ antithesis, the weight in this context is given to the δέ clause, strengthened by πολλάκις against ἐνίοτε. But both legs of the antithesis are necessary (as in 79f) to explain the first of the three *aporiai* of 35-7, namely the cause of vice. The emphasis on the δέ clause is probably related more to the third *aporia*, how children err.

F. (84-106) (Jacoby F102)

84 Posidonius reasonably (εἰκότως) attaches to this discussion the phenomena from physiognomy. Two general categories (ὅσα . . . πάντα) are instanced (85-8): all broad-chested warmer creatures are more spirited by nature (φύσει), the broad-hipped and colder, more cowardly.

88-90 The theory is enlarged to include environment (κατὰ τὰς χώρας) through which men's characters (τοῖς ἦθεσι) are largely (οὐ σμικρῶ) different in cowardice or daring, love of pleasure or toil.

90-3 The grounds given (ὡς) are that the emotional movements (Posidonius' term, 102) of the soul follow always the physical state (τῇ διαθέσει τοῦ σώματος), which is altered (ἀλλοιοῦσθαι) in no small degree from the temperature (τῆς κράσεως; cf. F49.71ff) in the environment (κατὰ τὸ περιέχον).

Galen's pamphlet *De Sequela* bears the title, ὅτι ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κράσεσιν αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ἐπονται. Not only is Posidonius again referred to there, but the development of argument in ch. xi is parallel to that in F169 (see F35), which substantiates the relevance of this section *F* for Posidonius' argument. Interest in the effect of environment on character

was early in Greece, cf. Hippocrates, *Airs, Waters, Places*. For Aristotle and physiognomy, cf. also *De An.* 403a.

93-6 Galen adds that Posidonius says (there is no reason to delete φησι in 95 with Müller) that even the blood in animals differs in its characteristics, a topic which Aristotle developed at length. For Aristotle refer to *Pol.* vii.6.1327b 18ff, and cf. *Problemata* xiv.1ff and *Physiognomici Scriptores*, ed. R. Foerster (Teubner), Leipzig, 1893, II. Frs. 39-62. Sandbach (*Aristotle and the Stoics*) suggested *De Part. Anim.* 647b 30-648a 13, and 650b 19-651a 19. There is some trace of physiognomy in the earlier Stoa (D.L. vii.173 = *SVF* 1.204; D.L. vii.129 = *SVF* 1.248; *SVF* 1.518 (Tertullian, *De An.* 5), but there is no sign of it in Chrysippus. Cf. also Plb. 4.21; Sen. *De Ira* ii.19.1-3; Strabo, ii.3.7 (F49).

96-103 Galen puts this topic off for further discussion when he turns to Hippocrates and Plato on this subject. At this point he is merely concerned with Chrysippus and his followers, who as well as their general ignorance of questions concerning emotions, do not know that different physical mixtures (or temperaments) produce their own 'emotional movements', the term usually given them by Posidonius; see F153.

103-6 But Aristotle straight out calls all such settled states (καταστάσεις) of mind in animals characters (ἤθη, adopting De Lacy's emendation in 103 for ἤδη *H*; ἤδει *L*), and explains in what way they are composed (συνίστανται) in their different mixtures.

On the face of it, this reference to Aristotle comes from Galen, and I cannot find it in our extant Aristotle. But its expression may help to explain how this whole passage on physiognomy is connected with what comes before in this fragment. It could relate to the second *aporia* listed by Posidonius in line 37, which Chrysippus failed to explain, namely τοὺς τρόπους τῆς συστάσεως (τῆς κακίας). Then indeed Posidonius συνάπτει εἰκότως τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις (84). And then the reference to Aristotle may have come from

Hippocrates, *Airs, Waters, Places*. For my, cf. also *De An.* 403a.

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Leipzig, 1893, II. Frs. 39-62. Sandicus suggested *De Part. Anim.* 647b 30-3-651a 19. There is some trace of earlier Stoa (D.L. vii.173 = *SVF* 1.204; 8; *SVF* 1.518 (Tertullian, *De An.* 5), in Chrysippus. Cf. also Plb. 4.21; Sen. i, ii.3.7 (F49).

this topic off for further discussion of Hippocrates and Plato on this subject. At issue is concerned with Chrysippus and his view of their general ignorance of questions of psychology do not know that different physical elements (elements) produce their own 'emotional elements' usually given them by Posidonius; see

the straight out calls all such settled elements of mind in animals characters (ἡθη, translation in 103 for ἡδη H; ἡδει L), say they are composed (συνίστανται) elements.

This reference to Aristotle comes from the end of it in our extant Aristotle. But it is hard to explain how this whole passage on psychology is connected with what comes before in this passage. It relates to the second *aporia* listed by Aristotle which Chrysippus failed to explain, the nature of the τῆς συστάσεως (τῆς κακίας). Then the reference to Aristotle may have come from

him. Certainly what remains (106-17), in spite of Galen's οἶμα, is Posidonian in content, and F31 follows immediately.

G. (106-117)

The understanding of the τρόποι τῆς συστάσεως of vice naturally leads to the understanding of its cure (ἰασις, 107). The problem of evil is not so much a metaphysical one for Posidonius, as a psychological problem, and the important question is the practical one of psychiatry: what one does about it. See above under Context and, for θεραπεία, Frs. 163-8, F31.

There is no simple rule because:

(1) in some the cure of the πάθη of the soul is easy because (a) their 'emotional movements' are not strong, and (b) the rational is not weak by nature (φύσει, because of their physical mixture?), nor void of understanding; it is through ignorance (cf. above, 80) and bad habits that such men are compelled (ἀναγκάζεσθαι) to live by emotions (ἐμπαθῶς).

(2) But in some the cure is hard and rough, i.e. when (a) the movements of emotion which necessarily (ἀναγκαιῶς) occur through their physical state, are in fact big and violent, and (b) the rational is *by nature* weak and uncomprehending.

114-17 For the cure must be two-fold, if one is going to improve the man's character:

(a) the rational (τὸ λογιστικόν) aspect must grasp knowledge of the truth;

(b) the movements of emotion must be blunted by habituation (ἐθισθείσας) to good practices.

Compare Frs. 31, 165, 164.