An Intellectualism conception of Desire
In the Protagoras, Plato has the character Socrates take up the issue of what "rules" a human being. Socrates suggests to Protagoras, and Protagoras agrees, that it is "knowledge" and that "knowledge is a leader and a ruler" with respect to what a human being does. In the Gorgias and Meno, Socrates can seem to have a view of human action inconsistent with the intellectualist conception of desire he expresses in the Protagoras.
This conception of what rules a human being presupposes what has come to be known as
Socratic Intellectualism: that desire is or stems from beliefs about
what is good and what is bad.
"Come, Protagoras, and reveal this about your mind: What do you believe about knowledge (ἐπιστήμην)? Do you go along with the majority? They think this way about it, that it is not powerful, neither a leader nor a ruler (ἡγεμονικὸν), that while knowledge is often present, what rules is something else, sometimes desire, sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain, at other times love, often fear. They think of knowledge as being dragged around by these other things, as if it were a slave. Does the matter seem like that to you? Or does it seem to you that knowledge is a fine thing capable of ruling, and if someone were to know what is good and bad, he would not be forced by anything to act otherwise than knowledge dictates, and that intelligence would be sufficient to save him?
Not only does it seem as you say, but it would be shameful for me of all people to say that wisdom and knowledge are anything but the strongest in human affairs" (Protagoras 352a).
"Well is there something you call dread, or fear? And is it—I address myself to you, Prodicus [a Sophist and contemporary of Socrates]—the same as I have in mind—something I describe as an expectation (προσδοκίαν) of bad, whether you call it fear or dread?
Protagoras and Hippias agreed to this description of dread or fear; but Prodicus thought this was dread, not fear.
No matter, Prodicus, I said, but my point is this: if our former statements are true, will any man wish to go after what he dreads, when he may pursue what he does not? Surely this is impossible after what we have admitted—that he regards as evil that which he dreads? And what is regarded as evil is neither pursued nor accepted willingly, we saw, by anyone" (Protagoras 358c).
Desire is Part of Reason
Socratic Intellectualism conceives of desires as beliefs of a certain kind and as part of reason.
According to this conception, as part of reason, human beings form beliefs about what is good and what is bad. Further, when they see an opportunity to get what they believe is good (flee from what they believes is bad), these beliefs motivate them to act on these opportunities.
This understanding of reason is in opposition to the view that reason is a general process of forming and retracting beliefs. On this conception, reason does not provide motivation. Rather, given a desire for something, it provides beliefs about what to do to satisfy the desire.
How to Control Action
It seems uncontroversial that a human being controls his actions, and thus the direction his life takes, by controlling his desires. The question is how he controls his desires, and Socrates has an answer: to control one's desires care for the soul so that reason controls belief.
If, as Socrates thought, desires are or stem from beliefs about what is good and what is bad, then a human being controls his desires by controlling his beliefs. If his beliefs are true, he desires the right things, chooses wisely, and hence makes the best of the situations he encounters.
The problem is that most people are confused about what is good and what is bad. They have false beliefs about these things, and the suggestion in the early dialogues is that Socrates thought that the love of wisdom eliminates these false beliefs by eliminating inconsistency in belief.
A Corollary to Intellectualism
The word 'paradox'
derives from the Greek adjective
which transliterates as paradoxos and means "contrary to expectation, incredible."
Socratic paradoxes are thus propositions
Socrates endorses but seem obviously false.
This conception of reason and desire helps make sense of a Socratic paradox: that "For Simonides was not so ill-educated as to say that he praised a person who willingly did no bad, as though there were some who did bad willingly. I am fairly sure of this--that none of the wise men considers that anybody ever willingly errs or willingly does base and evil deeds; they are well aware that all who do base and evil things do them unwillingly (ἑκόντα)..." (Protagoras 345d).
Simonides of Ceos was a lyric poet, c. 566 - 468 BCE. Protagoras 345d occurs in a discussion of the meaning of certain of his remarks about being and becoming good.
Socrates does not explain why "wise men" are "well aware that all who do base and evil things do them unwillingly." The argument he uses to show the many that they are committed to believing that "no one willingly goes after what is bad or what he thinks is bad" depends on the premise that "that the pleasant is good and the painful bad." "surely no one willingly (ἑκὼν) goes after what is bad or what he thinks is bad; it is not in human nature (ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει), apparently, to do so..." (Protagoras 358c).
It seems possible that someone who tries to bring about something he believes is bad need not be confused. This, however, is not possible if Socrates is right about desire.
Socrates does not describe very clearly what it is for someone to "willingly (ἑκὼν) go after what is bad or what he thinks to be bad," but he seems to have the following in mind:
• S believes that he can do a
• S does not believe that doing b is better than than doing a
• S believes that doing b is worse than than doing a
• S does b
Given Socratic Intellectualism and an assumption about what motivates action, these propositions are inconsistent and hence at least one is false.
Here is the proof that the propositions are inconsistent.
Since S does b, and since all action is motivated by desire, it follows that S desires to do b. Where does S get this desire? According to Socratic Intellectualism, all desires are or stem from beliefs about what is good and what is bad. So, given Socratic Intellectualism, it follows that this desire is or stems from a belief about whether b is better than a. Hence, given Socratic Intellectualism and the assumption about what motivates action, it follows that
• S believes that doing b is better than doing a
This contradicts the second proposition in the description of what it is for someone to "willingly go after the bad." So one of the following must be false: Socratic Intellectualism, the assumption that all action is motivated by desire, or one of the propositions in the description.
"[T]o Socrates it appeared ... that knowledge alone could really make men free. Only good conduct, he maintained, is truly voluntary; a bad man is constrained by ignorance to do what is contrary to his real wish, which is always for his own greatest good: only knowledge can set him free to realise his wish" (Henry Sidwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers, 5th edition. (Macmillan, 1902), 25). Further, given Socratic Intellectualism, someone who goes after what is bad does so unwillingly. He is constrained by false belief and thus ignorance. By nature, a human being desires to go after what is good and desires to avoid what is bad. So if he goes after what is bad, his ignorance has constrained him and prevented him from acting correctly.
The Project Remains Incomplete
At this point in Plato's project to understand Socrates, given the discussions in which the character engages in the Euthyphro, Laches, and Protagoras, the answers to
• what is the thinking in the soul that leads to action
• what is it to control this thinking and thus the direction one's life takes
• how does the love of wisdom lead to this competency in living
are a little clearer. So now it is a little easier to understand the competency in living that Socrates seems to have in mind in the Apology when he castigates the Athenians for not giving enough attention to "wisdom and truth and the best state of [the] soul."
Even so, there remain several puzzles about Socrates and his life in the love of wisdom.
Socrates, as Plato portrays him, assumes that his interlocutors are confused and that this confusion is eliminated by eliminating their inconsistency in belief. This presupposes that false belief is the problem, not the absence of knowledge. They have the necessary knowledge, but their false beliefs confuse them and prevent them from living a good life.
This assumes the knowledge that constitutes wisdom is not eliminated in the questions that eliminate inconsistency in belief. Yet, it is not obvious human beings have beliefs they cannot abandon. Moreover, consistency does not imply truth. So even if one's beliefs are consistent, it does not follow as a matter of logic alone that these beliefs are all true.
Socrates, as Plato portrays him, seems to suppose that in the definitions of the virtues only the reference class varies. Piety, for example, is what is appropriate in matters involving the gods. The definitions of the other virtues are instances of this general form. Justice is what is appropriate with respect to human beings, courage is what is appropriate in fearful situations, and so on. Socrates' interlocutors fail to understand this. They try to identify the virtues with some of their salient instances. This in part is why they contradict themselves.
Given this understanding, it seems that knowledge of what the virtues are provides no guidance about what to do in particular situations. To know what to do, it is not enough to know the definitions. It is necessary to know what is appropriate in the particular situations.
So it is unclear why the emphasis in the early dialogues is on the search for definitions.
The Beginning of an Understanding
It is traditional to describe Socrates in the early dialogues as searching for a "definition" of courage and the other things he uses his "what is it?" question to ask about, but he is not asking to be told about the meaning of words. Socrates wants to know what courage and the virtues are. It is not obvious what the solutions to these puzzles are, but it seems clear that Socrates thinks that knowledge of ethical matters is knowledge of what is good and what is bad.
In the Laches, for example, Nicias says that Socrates and
Laches have not been "defining courage" in the right way
(194c). Laches had been defining courage in terms of salient
examples. He says that someone who is courageous "is willing to stay
at his post and face the enemy, and does not run away"
Nicias suggests a different approach: that
"courage is a kind of wisdom (σοφίαν)"
Socrates seems to encourage this suggestion and seems further to suggest that
wisdom is knowledge of what is
good and what is bad
"Now do you think, Nicias, there could be anything wanting to the virtue of a
man who knew all good things, and all about their production in the present, the future,
and the past, and all about bad things likewise? Do you suppose that such a man
could be lacking in temperance, or justice, and holiness, when he alone has the gift of taking
due precaution, in his dealings with gods and men, as regards what is to be dreaded and what
is not, and of procuring good things, owing to his knowledge of the right behaviour towards them?
I think, Socrates, there is something in what you say" (Laches 199d).
In the Protagoras, in the discussion with Protagoras about the unity of virtue, Socrates suggests that the virtues and wisdom are the same thing (Protagoras 329b).
"Well now, the cause of cowards being cowardly, do you call this cowardice or courage?
Cowardice, I call it.
And were they not found to be cowards through ignorance (ἀμαθίαν) of what is dreadful?
And so they are cowards because of that ignorance?
And the cause of their being cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?
Then ignorance of what is dreadful and not dreadful will be cowardice?
But surely courage, is the opposite of cowardice.
Then the wisdom that knows what is and what is not dreadful is opposed to the ignorance of these things?
And the ignorance of them is cowardice?
So the wisdom (σοφία) that knows what is and what is not dreadful is courage, being opposed to the ignorance of these things? Why is it, Protagoras, that you neither affirm nor deny what I ask you?
Finish it, Socrates, by yourself" (Protagoras 360c ).
The idea, then, is that someone who knows what courage is knows what is good and what is bad in circumstances that inspire fear and hence does the right thing in such circumstances.
This suggests that the prior understanding of Socrates was incomplete. It was that
• the soul has virtue just in case it has wisdom
• this wisdom is knowledge about ethical matters
To this characterization, it is necessary to add that
• knowledge about ethical matters is knowledge of what is good and bad
What Socrates wants, it seems, when he presses his interlocutors to say what the virtues are, is to know what is good and bad in the circumstances a human being faces in life.
Now, given the truth of Socrates' intellectual conception of desire, it follows that
• wisdom is necessary and sufficient for the virtues of character
In this way, someone with wisdom seems to have the competency in living that Socrates, in the Apology, castigates the Athenians for not caring enough about. Since he knows what is good and what is bad, and since desires are or stem from beliefs about what is good and what is bad, he does what is appropriate in the various circumstances he faces as he lives his life.
More Explanation is Necessary
This gives Plato an understanding of the life in the love of wisdom he seems to take Socrates to have lived, but to vindicate Socrates and defend this life as the good life, he needs to show that
• the elimination of inconsistency is sufficient for wisdom
Plato needs to explain why the elimination of inconsistency leaves human beings with the knowledge they need to live a good life. Further, he needs to explain
• what activity or activities makes a life good
• how wisdom and the virtues of character are sufficient for this life
Initially, at least, it looks like these explanations will not be easy for Plato to give.
Perseus Digital Library:
Plato's, Laches, Protagoras
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon:
ἀκρατής, (ἀ + κράτος), akratēs, adjective, "without strength"
ἑκών, hekōn, adjective, "of one's own accord"
ἡγεμονικός , hēgemonikos, adjective, "capable of command, authoritative"
παράδοξος, paradoxos, adjective, "contrary to expectation, incredible"
προσδοκίαν, prosdokian, noun, "expectation"
"[I]n the Protagoras, Socrates seems to argue
as if the soul just were reason, and the passions were
reasoned beliefs or judgments of some kind, and as if,
therefore, we were entirely guided or motivated by beliefs of
one kind or another. On this picture of the soul, it is easy
to see why Socrates thinks that nobody acts against his
knowledge or even his beliefs: nothing apart from beliefs
could motivate such an action" (Michael Frede,
"Introduction," xxx. Plato. Protagoras, vii-xxxii).
"[Socrates] relied on a substantial notion of the soul as what guides
our behavior and whose health and well-being should thus be a primary concern
of ours. His extreme intellectualism seems to have been based on a conception
of the soul as a mind or reason, such that our desires turn out to be beliefs
of a certain kind" (Michael Frede, "The Philosopher," 10. Greek thought: A Guide
to Classical Knowledge, 3-16).
"[If] virtue is a certain kind of wisdom... [it]] is not just one among several virtues. Rather, one must wonder whether wisdom is also a necessary condition for the other virtues or even whether the other virtues are not just parts of this wisdom. Perhaps, indeed, one and the same wisdom, applied in different contexts, grounds or even guarantees a courageous or pious or just response, as the context demands" (Michael Frede, "Introduction," xxii. Plato. Protagoras, vii-xxxii). "[I]f the [Protagoras] does suggest a positive thesis, it is the strong thesis that the virtues are identical with wisdom, the knowledge of what is good and bad. ... Being virtuous, Socrates suggests, is being wise, possessing a science or an art of properly evaluating things" (Michael Frede, "Introduction," xxxii. Plato. Protagoras, vii-xxxii).