What Living Natural Bodies Are
The Soul is the Substance as the Form
"The substance (οὐσία) is the
cause of existing, and here, in living things, to
exist is to live, and the soul (ψυχή) is the cause and
(On the Soul II.4.415b).
Outline of On the Soul (the first in a series of physical works devoted to living natural bodies)
I.2-5. Previous views about the soul
II.1-3. The soul is a substance and form
II.4. Nutrition and reproduction
II.5-III.2. Sense perception
III.9-11. Movement of animals
III.12-13. Summary All natural bodies have natures. The nature is the "starting-point of change and staying unchanged." It is the organization of the material so that there exists a body of the kind. These natures are forms, and these forms are in matter and separate only in account.
In the case of living natural bodies, Aristotle says that the form is a "soul" (ψυχή).
The Soul in Living Natural Bodies
"We say that the soul grieves, rejoices, is courageous, or afraid, and also grows angry, perceives and thinks; all these seem to be movements; hence one might suppose that the soul is moved; but this is not a necessary inference. Let us grant that grief, joy and thinking are all movements, i.e., that each of them is a process of being moved; let us further admit that the movement is caused by the soul—e.g., that anger and fear are particular movements of the heart, and that thinking is a movement of this or of something else, some of these processes involving change of place and others change of quality in certain parts (of what parts and under what conditions need not be considered now): still to say that the soul gets angry is as if one were to say that it weaves or builds a house. Probably it is better not to say that the soul pities, or learns, or thinks, but to say that it is the instrument whereby man does these things, that the movement does not take place in the soul, but sometimes penetrates to it, and sometimes starts from it" (On the Soul I.4.408b).
By conceiving of human beings as natural living bodies, and by conceiving of natural bodies as forms in matter, Aristotle tries to correct what he understands as Plato's mistakes.
Plato thought that the soul is something whose existence is independent of the existence of the body. Aristotle thinks this is a mistake and that the soul is not separate without qualification. As the form of a natural body, the soul is not separate from matter. The is an organization of material so that there exists a living body. The soul, in this way, is in matter and separate in account.
(The terminology "not separate without qualification" can be confusing. On Plato's conception of the soul, the soul is separate. There is not need to add a qualification. On Aristotle's conception of the soul, it is necessary to add a qualification. For Aristotle, the soul is separate in account.)
Plato thought that the soul can change and that it can be in a better or worse state. Aristotle thinks this is a mistake too. Because the the soul is the organization of the material into a living natural body, the soul is not the kind of thing that can change in this way. A human being can change. He can become wiser, for example. In this, however, it is the human being, not the soul, that changes. The soul makes the change possible. It is the starting-point for various changes in a living natural body, but the soul itself does not change when the body changes in these ways.
The Soul is a First Actuality
"Substances (οὐσίαι) most of all are thought to be bodies, especially natural bodies, for they are the starting-points for other bodies. Of the natural bodies, some have life and some do not. Life we say is self-nutrition and growth and decay. Thus every natural body having life is a substance as a composite. But since it is a body of a definite kind, viz., having life, the body cannot be soul, for the body is not something predicated of a subject, but rather is itself to be regarded as a subject, i.e., as matter. So the soul must be substance as the form (ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος) of a natural body, which potentially has life. And substance is actuality (ἐντελέχεια). The soul, then, is the actuality of a body. But actuality is of two kinds, corresponding to knowledge and contemplation. The soul is an actuality like knowledge. Sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul, and waking corresponds to contemplation, sleeping to knowledge since it comes first. That is why the soul is the first actuality (ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη) of a natural body having life potentially in it" (On the Soul II.1.412a). Aristotle says that the soul is a "first actuality" (ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη) of the body. This is a thesis in ontology. The idea is that the soul is the substance of a certain kind of existence.
The noun "actuality" (ἐντελέχεια) is a word Aristotle invents by combining ἐντελής and ἔχειν. The adjective ἐντελής means "complete, full." The infinitive ἔχειν means "to have" or "to hold."
An "actuality," then, is the substance of a "complete, full" existence, and a first actuality is an actuality but is an actuality with qualification. The qualification is "first."
The distinction between an actuality with and without and qualification is difficult. It will become a little clearer in subsequent lectures. The discussion here is a first sketch.
As the form of a living natural body, the soul is the organization that makes material be a living natural body. It is because the material has this organization that there is a natural body that lives in the way that characterizes members of the kind. Without the organization, there is no natural body of the kind and hence no characteristic way life. There is only a heap of materials that have the potential to be a living natural body. The soul is the "actuality" of this potential.
Consider a human being. If to be a human being is to be a rational animal, then the soul of a human being is the organization of the material (that constitutes the human being) so that this material exists in the form of a rational animal. Each human being lives a human life because each is material organized in the form of a rational animal. Without this organization, there is only material with the potential to be a human being. The soul of a human being, according to Aristotle, is the actuality of this potential. It makes the material be a human being.
This helps explain what Aristotle means when he says soul is an "actuality," but it remains to know why he thinks it is a "first actuality" and hence is an actuality with qualification.
The answer, it seems, is that the life of a living natural body consists different activities at different times. Living natural bodies grow and mature. They eat in certain circumstances and sleep in others. As the organization of the material, the soul makes the material be a living body with the potentials to engage in these activities. An actuality without qualification is the form of an existence that is not different at different times. Something with this existence has a "complete, full" existence. It does not have potentials that it exercises in different circumstances.
It will become clear in subsequent lectures that Aristotle thinks that some things exist in this way.
Perseus Digital Library:
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon:
ἐντελέχεια, entelecheia, noun, "full, complete reality"
ἐντελής, entelēs, adjective, "complete, full"
ὕλη, hylē, noun, "matter"
Arizona State University Library: Loeb Classical Library
Aristotle, On the Soul
"Now when Aristotle talks of natural objects, he thinks of them as having a nature. A
nature is a substantial form. In the case of an organism it is a soul. According to
Aristotle it is this nature which explains the general pattern of behavior of an
object of a certain kind. Indeed, Aristotle defines a nature as a principle of motion,
or change, and rest. Given any particular change, for instance the growth to a given size
of an organism, the change to this size will be accidental to the object, as this size
is accidental to the object. But it is not accidental to grow to a size within the range
of size objects this kind normally have. And the nature is supposed to explain why the object
grows to this sort of size and then stops growing. And that it should behave like this is not
accidental to it"
(Michael Frede, "Introduction," 14. Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum, Michael Frede & David Charles (Oxford University Press, 2000), 1-52).
"The forms of sensible substances involve potentiality in two ways, and hence are not pure actualities, though it is the essence of a form to be an actuality. They need matter to be realized in, and thus are the forms of objects subject to change. But, what is more, when we turn to the paradigms of sensible substances, living beings, it turns out that their forms themselves essentially contain an element of potentiality. When Aristotle in De Anima [On the Soul] II.1 defines the soul as the 'first actuality' of a certain kind of body, this very language reflects the fact that the soul in a way is constituted by the various abilities to exercise the life- functions characteristic of the kind of living being in question, but that not all these life-functions are exercised all the time. What is more, some of the abilities that characterize the soul, like virtue and knowledge, are only acquired. Thus, the forms of sensible substances are not pure actualities; they in part are constituted by unrealized possibilities and in that sense are not fully real. The form that is the unmoved mover, on the other hand, is pure actuality. It neither needs matter to be realized nor does it involve any abilities that might or might not be realized or exercised. The unmoved mover is just eternally thinking the same thought" (Michael Frede, "The Unity of General and Special Metaphysics: Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics," 89-90).